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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, under rate-of-retum regulation regulators set electric utility 
prices to cover operating costs phis an allowed return on investment. Nwaeze 
[1998] assesses the effectiveness o f rate-of-retum regulation and documents the 
alignment between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. 
However, recent federal and state deregulation has increased conqietition in the 
electricity generation industry. As a result, certain investments in plant and 
equÿment have been rendered noncompetitive or obsolete, and certain deferred 
eiqienses may not provide future benefits. These “above-maiket” costs generally 
referred to as stranded costs, may have very low market value relative to their 
book value. The market’s perception of the recoverability o f stranded costs may 
affect the relation between maricet value and book value. This study will examine 
the relation between market value and book value over time, and will investigate 
the determinants of a utility’s discretionary choice to write-off stranded costs. 
Results o f this study may document whether deregulation has affected the 
alignment of market value with book value. Additionally, the results may provide 
evidence on timeliness and accuracy in accounting for impairment of long-lived 
assets, and it may identify fiictors that influence the discretionary choice to write­
off stranded costs.
Teets [1992] asserts that regulatmn affects the relation between 
unexpected earnings and stock price changes because earnings changes are less 
permanent for rate-regulated firms. Teets finds the market response to earnings
infi>nnatk>n smaller on average for a sample o f rate-regulated firms. Nwaeze 
[1998] demonstrates that over time, rate-of-retum regulation for electric utilities is 
reasonably effective in aligning market value with book value because all 
reasonable costs are eventually recoverable. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
substantially altered the regulatory climate for electric utilities. Johnson, Niles 
and Suydam [1998] document significant negative effects o f deregulation on 
market values. This s tu ^  examines the market value-book value relation during 
the post-regulatory period first by comparing it to the regulatory period. Ros, 
Domagalski and O’Connor [1996] suggest that an increase in a utility’s exposure 
to stranded costs is associated on average with a decrease in a utility’s market-to- 
book ratio. Second, this study tests whether stranded costs are correlated with the 
difference between maricet value and book value.
Under the rate-of-retum regulatory model, revenues are set to cover 
operating e^qpenses plus the cost of capital D’Souza [1998] asserts that this link 
between accounting e?q)enses and cash flows for rate-regulated firms influences 
firms’ discretionary accounting policy choices. Stranded cost write-offe could 
lead the utility’s regulator to reduce rates leading to direct reductions in cash 
flows. Consequently, utilities will be reluctant to write-off stranded costs that are 
still recoverable in customer rates. This study considers whether various 
regulatory, coirqietitive, and financial factors are associated with the timing of 
stranded cost write-ofife.
The remainder of this ptqxer is organized as follows. Charter 2 contains 
background information on the electric utility industry. Chiq>ter 3 describes the
2
hypothesis development and research methodology for the examination of the 
relation between the market value o f equity and the book value o f equity for 
electric utilities. Chuter 4 describes the hypothesis development and research 
methodology for the determinants of timing in the stranded cost write-off 
decision. Cluqrter S contains hypothesis testing, descriptive statistics, main 
results, additional analyses and sensitivity analyses for the market value-book 
value relatioiL Chuter 6 contains hypothesis testing, descriptive statistics, main 
results, and sensitivity analyses for the determinants o f timing in the stranded cost 
write-off decision. Chtq>ter 7 contains concluding remaries.
CHAPTER2
BACKGROUND
2.1. Industry Ovendew
Regulation of the electrk utility industry began early in the 20* century. 
Utilities were considered natural monopolies and were given the right to operate 
in defined geographical areas without competition. State regulatory commissmns 
were established to ensure that customers received fiiir prices and good service. 
In most cases, rate-of-retum regulation was used, and rates were based on 
operating costs phis an allowed return on the co ita l investment. However, under 
the regulatory process, utilities have few incentives to reduce costs and increase 
efBciency because all reasonable costs are recoverable and an allowed return is 
received on the investment base. Moreover, since the utility’s profit is based on 
the co ita l base, too much emphasis is placed on c£^>ital investment. As a result, 
the utility industry over-invested in production fecilities (generating c^>acity), 
and buik large, eiqiensive fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. In the process, the 
utilities lost their technological and cost advant%%es over indqiendent nonrutility 
energy con^anies.
In response to these shortcomings, policymakers began restructuring and 
deregulating the electric utility industry. Legislation initially targeted the 
wholesale power maritet i^iiere electricity is sold between electric utilities or other 
non-utility electricity providers. Congress began by allowing unregulated 
suppliers and buyers to access the transmission networic, thereby opening the 
M^lesale electricity market to competition. The Energy Policy Act o f 1992 lead
to increased wholesale conqietition and eliminated the power-generation 
monopoly at the electric plant level. Next, state legislatures and regulatory 
commissions across the country began e?q)loriiig direct retail access (referred to as 
retail wheeling') for electricity consumers. More than 20 states have already 
introduced some form of retail wheeling.
As the power-generatfon morx>poly was eliminated, some utilities were 
foced with excess c^xacity and the irrunediate prospect of competition that was 
expected to drive down prices for generated power and ultimately lower the 
market value o f exqxensive, inefficient power plants. Accordingly, during the 
transition to a mote competitive market, some capitalized costs are being rendered 
obsolete or uncompetitive and therefore unrecoverable. The net effect is that 
certain assets or portfons of assets are left “stranded” relative to the market.
2.2. Stranded €ktsts
There are three major categories o f stranded costs: regulatory assets^, 
generating plants, and long-term purchase contracts. Regulatory assets are 
exqxenses that are deferred by state regulatory commissions to minimiTie the level 
and volatility o f electricity rates. See table 1 for typical regulatory assets. 
Regulatory assets include large “one-time” exqxenses, however, the bulk o f the 
value is in deferred federal taxes and pensions (Loxley, 1999). The large
'  Retail wheeling -  a transmission or distribution service by w hidt utilities deliver electric power 
sold by a diird party direct^ to retail customers. This would allow an individual retail customer to 
choose his or her electricity stqiplicr, but still receive delivery using die power lines o f the local 
utility (Edison Electric Institute, February 2000).
 ^Regulatory assets are deferred expenses capitalized in accordance with SPAS No. 71 (FASB 
1982). Included are costs diat have been incurred with the expectation that the regulator will 
allow for future recovery, hi anon-regulated enterprise sudi costs are ordinarily diarged against 
current income.
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difiference between book and tax depreciation on generating assets results in a 
deferred tax liability. The related tax esqiense, normal^ e)q*ensed under GAAP, 
is deferred and reported as a regulatory asset. Similarly, the accrual of pensk>n 
benefits, normally e?q)ensed under GAAP, are deferred and reported as a 
regulatory asset.
Under rate-of-retum regulation, regulators try to minimize price increases 
by allowing for cost recovery o f generating plants slowly over long depreciable 
lives (30 to 40 years). As a result, these assets may have ejœessive book values. 
Consequently, some utilities may be unable to recover a large portion of their 
investment in generating plants, particularly nuclear power plants.
Nuclear power plants represent a significant portion o f stranded costs fiom 
generating plants. Most o f these plants suffer fiom poor operating performance 
resulting in high production costs. Studness [1995] suggests that most o f the 
stranded nuclear power plants stem from the 34 nuclear power plants that were 
placed in service after 1984. These 34 units account for approximately 70 percent 
o f the electric utility industry’s investment in generating assets.
Nuclear power plants have long been considered the white elephants of the 
electricity generation industry, and a nuclear power plant has not been built in the 
U. S. in over 22 years. However, some utilities are updating their nuclear power 
plants with the latest technology and safety systems. Also, the current political 
administration has streamlined the building process and encouraged increased 
production at nuclear power plants. Additionally, the recent combination o f 
higher prices for natural gas and petroleum, and the energy shortage in California
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have created new interest In nuclear power. This sudden interest might increase 
the market value o f nuclear power plants. However, estimates o f stranded nuclear 
power plants used in this study predate the sudden interest in nuclear power.
Long-term contracts to purchase electricity 6om utility and nonutility 
generators were 6equently encouraged or even mandated by state regulatory 
commissions to ensure supply and eliminate price risk. Most long-term purchase 
contracts were written prior to 1990 and are based on energy prices^ that were in 
effect prior to deregulation o f the wholesale market. In the early 1990’s after 
deregulation o f the wholesale market, fuel and power prices declined. As a result, 
some utilities were legally bound to purchase power at “above-mailœt” rates. 
Under rate-of-retum regulation, the cost of purchased power is considered a 
reasonable operating cost and therefore a regulated utility can pass on the above­
market costs to its c^tive customers. In a conqxetitive market, the excess of the 
contract price over the market price may not be recoverable in electricity rates.
Coal supplies have been abundant and prices have generally been 
favorable, but recently natural gas and petroleum siq>plies have fallen and prices 
have surged. As a result, some long-term purchase contracts may no longer be 
above market. However, estimates o f above-market long-term purchase contracts 
used in this study are based on energy prices that were in effect in the early 
1990*s after deregulation of the wholesale market, and predate the recent changes 
in petroleum and natural gas prices.
electric utility industry relies on various fuel sources to generate electricity including coal, 
nuclear power, natural gas, petroleum and renewable sources.
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Estimâtes o f stranded costs ate based on predictions of post-regulation 
prices, (plication o f supply and demand, and cost-vohune-profit analysis 
(Freemont et aL, 1995). Moody’s [1995] estimates stranded costs for 114 U.S. 
investor-owned utilities at $135 billion. In a study conq>leted by Resource Data 
International^ [1997], stranded costs are estimated at $202 billion for the electric 
utility industry (investor-owned utilities account for $147 billion; public utilities 
for $33 billion; and cooperatives for $22 billion). Their study includes a detailed, 
plant-by-plant analysis o f stranded costs for every utility in the country. The 
estimated $202 billion includes the following conqwnents: $86 billion stranded 
generating assets, $(17) billion other generating assets with market value in 
excess of book value, $96 billion long-term above-market purchase contracts, 
$(12) billion long-term above-market sales contracts, and $49 billion regulatory 
assets.
*  Resource Data International, Inc. is recognized as an indq>endeat industry leader in electric 
power market information in the Lkiited States.
8
CHAPTERS
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
MARKET VALUE - BOOK VALUE RELATION
3.1. Hypothesis Devdt^ment
3.1.1. Literature Overview -  Regulation
Under traditional rate-based regulation, state regulatory commissions set 
rates to cover both operating and capital costs. Operating cost changes and 
additional capital investment are considered when the commission reviews the 
existing rates in what is called a *yite case.” Once the rates are revised, future 
cash flows revert to normal levels based on the target rate-of-retum allowed by 
the regulatory commission. If rates were revised continuously, then revenues 
would equal operating costs plus a return on the investment base, and the market 
value of the utility would equal its book value. In practice, rates are onty revised 
periodically leading to a ^regulatory lag’ during \^ diich changes in earnings may 
persist for a short time. Ifonce, regulation causes earnings to have limited 
inq>lications for changes in future cash flows.
Teets [1992] examines whether regulation can affect the cross-sectional
market response to earnings. Teets con^ared a sanq>le o f regulated electric utility
firms to non^regulated firms and found the market response to earnings
information smaller on average for the sample of regulated firms. Teets asserts
that regulation affects the relation between unexpected earnings and stock price
changes because earnings changes are less permanent for regulated firms and
therefore have limited implications for future cash flows. Teets concludes that
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regulation ‘buffers’ or shelters utilities fiom changes in the operating 
environment.
Nwaeze [1998] extends Teets [1992] and assesses the effectiveness o f 
rate-of-retum regulation by examining the alignment between the market value of 
equity and the book value of equity. He finds that over time the difference 
between market values and book values for electric utilities is not statistically 
significant. However, the difference between market values and book values for 
non-regulated firms is statistically significant. He suggests that rate-of-retum 
regulation is reasonably effective in aligning maricet value with book value.
3.1.2. Literature Overview - Deregulation
The Energy Policy Act o f 1992 substantially altered the regulatory climate 
for electric utilities. The law was designed to encourage efficiency in production 
arxl distribution while increasing conyetition in the generation and transmission 
o f wholesale electric power. Johnson, Niles and Suydam [1998] consider the 
market reaction to electric utility deregulation and the effect on shareholder 
wealth during the legislative period, 1991-1992. The legislative period includes 
introduction of deregulation legislation in the federal legislature, and the 
enactment into law o f the Energy Policy Act o f 1992. They conclude that 
deregulation had significant^ negative effects on stock values for investor-owned 
electric utilities. They find a significant negative market reaction to legislative 
events leading up to and including the enactment o f the Energy Policy Act of 
1992. Moreover, they find that firms with a higher percentage of assets
10
associated with nuclear fiicilities e^qierienced a more negative reaction to 
deregulation.
Besanko, D’Souza and Thiagarajan [2001] also analyze electric utility 
stock price reactions to events preceding the passage o f the Energy Policy Act of 
1992. Contrary to Johnson et aL, [1998] they find a neutral stock price reaction to 
events leading tq* to the passage o f the Energy Policy Act o f 1992. Moreover, 
they find utilities with low marginal costs experience a more fevorable stock price 
reaction than utilities with high marginal costs. Their analysis differs fiom 
Johnson et aL, [1998] in several ways. They use a larger sample size than 
Johnson et aL, [1998] and their study controls for the effect o f firm-specific 
characteristics. Also, Besanko et aL, [2001] use a methodology that controls for 
clustering by industry and time, instead of the standard event-study methodology 
used by Johnson et al., [1998].
The Energy Policy Act o f 1992 mandated Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) Order No. 888, issued in April 1996, which addressed 
transmission service and stranded costs. Order No. 888 requires all public utilities 
to provide transmission service for wholesale transactions on an open, 
nondiscriminatory basis, and allows for full recovery o f prudently incurred 
wholesale market stranded costs fiom wholesale customers. Although Order No. 
888 was widely e)q*ected and merely standardized changes in the electric utility 
industry that were already in effect, on a voluntary basis in many parts o f the 
country, the initial response was positive (Journal of Commerce, 1996). In fiwA, 
P%ach and Peace [2000] find that utilities with stranded costs experienced a
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significant positive maiket reaction to issuance o f Order No. 888. Pagach and 
Peace [2000] suggest that Order No. 888 reduced the uncertainty surrounding 
recoverability o f wholesale market stranded costs. However, Order No. 888 does 
not provide for recovery o f retail market stranded costs. The individual states 
must determine recoverability o f retail market stranded costs. After issuance o f 
FERC Order No. 888, Moody’s [1996] reported that state regulators would only 
provide for partial recovery of retail market stranded costs, and suggested that 
there was little change in total potential stranded costs.
3.1.3. Literature Overview —  Stranded Costs
Ros, Domagalski and O’Connor [1996] consider the effect o f electric 
utility stranded costs on the relation between market values and book values. 
Using Moody’s [1995] and Standard and Poor’s [1995] stranded cost estimates, 
they e}q)lain t^proximately 20% of the variability in 1995 year-end market-to- 
book ratios. They suggest that utilities most ejqwsed to stranded generating assets 
had lower ratios than utilities with less exposure. They assert that deregulation 
affects the market’s perception of recoverability o f stranded costs, and they 
demonstrate that stranded generating assets e?q)lain a significant amount of the 
cross-firm differences in the 1995 year-end mariœt-to-book ratios.
Blacconiere, Johnson and Johnson [1997] consider the usefulness o f 
financial statement information in ejqtlaining analysts’ estimates of stranded 
costs, and the effect o f increased conqxetition on the relation between market 
value and book value. Overall, their evidence suggests that historical-cost-based 
financial statements are useful for estimating stranded costs and for assessing the
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efifect of deregu]atk>n on electric utilities. Additionally, th ^  provide some 
evidence that cross-firm differences between market values and book values are 
related to cost conqtetitiveness and regulatory environment.
3.1.4. ffypotheses
While Nwaeze [1998] has documented the alignment o f market value and 
book value during the regulatory period, the post-regulatory results are mixed. 
Johnson et aL, [1998] find significantly negative effects on stock values, however, 
Besanko et aL, [2001] find a neutral stock price reaction. Johnson et aL, [1998] 
and Besanko et aL, [2001] are both event studies that estimate abnormal returns 
and use short event-windows (S and 3 days, respectively). Hence, these studies 
provide evidence concerning electric utility stock returns over a few days and 
relative to the general market, but they cannot address vriiether the market values 
o f utilities are above or below book values in the post-regulatory period.
Given the potentially negative effects of deregulation, hypothesis 1 
predicts that the level o f market value has declined such that market value and 
book value are no longer aligned. Hypothesis 1 examines the market value-book 
value relation during the post-regulatory period, 1993-1997, and con^wes it to 
the regulatory period, 1970-1990. Hence, hypothesis 1 (stated in the ahemative):
HI: The firm-specific mean of the market-to-book ratio during the
post-regulatory period, 1993-1997, is less than the firm-specific 
mean during the regulatory period, 1970-1990.
Johnson et aL, [1998] and Ros et aL, [1996] have documented that 
declines in firm-specific market value are associated with potentially stranded
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generating assets. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that changes in the firm- 
specific mean maricet value-book value relation should be related to firm-specific 
total stranded costs. Thus, hypothesis 2a predicts that firm-specific total stranded 
costs are related to the change in the market value-book value relation across 
periods: the regulatory period, 1970-1990 vs. the post-regulatory period, 1993- 
1997. Herxx, hypothesis 2a (stated in the alternative):
H2a: The change in the firm-specific mean o f the market-to-book ratio 
(the regulatory period vs. the post-regulatory period) is negatively 
related to firm-specific total stranded costs.
Loudder, Khurana and Boatsman [1996] find that the state regulatory
envirorunent affects a utility s ability to recover costs. Their results indicate that 
investors’ valuation of regulatory assets depends on the state regulatory 
envirorunent in which the utility is operating. Thus, hypothesis 2b predicts that 
the decline in the market value-book value relation across periods should be 
greater in un&vorable state regulatory envirorunents than in &vorable 
envirorunents. Hypothesis 2c predicts that the state regulatory environment will 
condition the relation between the level of stranded costs and the change in the 
market value-book value relation across periods. Specifically, the decline in the 
market value-book value relation across periods should be greater for firms with 
more stranded costs in unfovorable state regulatory environments than in 
fovorable state regulatory environments. Hypotheses 2b and 2c (stated in the 
alternative):
H2b: The decline in the firm-specific mean o f the market-to-book ratio 
(the regulatory period vs. the post-regulatory period) should be 
greater in unfovorable state regulatory environments.
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H2c: The decline in the firm-specific mean o f the market-to-book ratio 
(the regulatory period vs. the post-regulatory period) is negatively 
related to the interaction of the level o f stranded costs and the state 
regulatory environment.
3.2. Research Methodology
3.2.1. Sample and data sources
The initial sangle consists of the investor-owned utilities included in 
Standard Industrial Classifications [SICs] 4911 and 4931, that are included in 
both Compustat and The Value Line Investment Survey. Market values and 
financial statement data were obtained from Compustat. Book value data and 
state regulatory environment rankings were obtained firom the Value Line 
Investment Survey. Value Line’s book value data contains adjustments for 
regulatory assets recognized under SFAS No. 71. Resource Data International, 
Inc.’s stranded cost estimates^ were used. Descriptive statistics for the sangle 
are shown in Table 2.
3.2.2. Research design
Alignment o f market value and book value during the regulatory period
(Nwaeze, 1998) will be demonstrated by testing the cross-sectional mean o f the 
market-to-book ratio during the regulatory period (1970-1990). The mean 
should not be statistically different from one. The firm-specific mean o f the 
maricet-to-book ratio during the regulatory period (1970-1990) will also be 
tested.
 ^I am gratdiil to Don Pagach and Bob Peace Ar making avaflable their Resource Data 
International hic. data for this study.
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Hypothesis 1 examines whether firms’ average market vahie-book value 
relation during the post-regulatoiy period, 1993-1997, has changed such that the 
market-to-book ratio is less than the maricet-to-book ratio during the regulatory 
period, 1970-1990. To test Hypothesis 1, the difference between the firms’ 
average post-regulatory (1993-1997) and regulatoiy (1970-1990) market-to-book 
ratk>s will be tested.
Given the positive maricet reaction to Order No. 888, the post-regulatory 
period (1993-1997) will be partitioned into two periods: a before Order No. 888 
post-regulatory period (1993-1995), and an after Order No. 888 post-regulatory 
period (1996-1997). Hypothesis 1 will be tested using the two post-regulatory 
period partitions.
To test hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c, stranded costs are measured using 
Resource Data International’s detailed, plant-by-plant estimate o f stranded costs. 
The most recent detailed estimates of stranded costs are available only for 1997. 
To examine the impact o f the state regulatory environment on a utility’s ability 
to recover stranded costs, the stranded cost variable will be interacted with a state 
regulatory enviromnent variable. The Value Line Investment Survey rates the 
nature of state regulatory environments in which utilities operate. The periodic 
ratings are related to the fovorabkness of state regulatory com m ission rulings. 
Some utilities operate in more than one jurisdiction, therefore, a weighted 
average (weighted by stranded cost estimate) o f refevant state ratings will be 
used to conq>ute firm-qiecific regulatory ratings. State regulatory environments 
are rated below avenge, average and above average. Two dummy variables will
16
be used to c^ture un&vorable state regulatory environment ratings: REGHI and 
REGMD. REGHI equals 1 for below average ratings and REGMD equals 1 for 
average ratings.
Johnson et al., [1998] document increases in firm-specific and market 
risk during the legislative period, and suggest that negative maricet returns may 
be explained in part by increases in risk. However, they do not test for an 
association between increased risk and negative market returns. Prior research 
(Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; Nelson, 1996; and Beaver, Eger, Ryan and 
Wolfoon, 1989) indicates that inqwrtant determinants of variation in maficet-to- 
book ratios are conventional valuation variables such as systematic risk and 
return on equity. Overall, the prior research suggests that risk should be included 
as a control variable in the market value-book value relation. Johnson et aL, 
[1998] use beta to measure risk, however, there is evidence that beta is not 
significantly related to risk (Fama and French, 1992 and Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000). Fama and French, [1992] document a positive relation 
between market leverage and ex post mean stock returns. Gebhardt et aL, [2000] 
find that a market leverage measure (debt-to-maricet value of equity) exhibits a 
significant positive correlation with risk. To control for risk, a risk variable, 
RISK, measures the change across periods (the post-regulatory period vs. the 
regulatory period) in the ratio o f total long-term debt to the market value of 
equity. To preclude an omitted variables bias, return on equity (ROE) is 
included as a control variable.
The following equation is estimated to test hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c:
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(MV/BV)<^-(MV/BV>4, = a« + aiSC<^ + a2REGHI<^
(-) (-)
+ aj REGMD /jy + a^  SC *  REGHI
(-) (-)
+ af S C ^  * REGMD a$ RISK f+ ay ROE % (1)
(-)
where the variables are defined as:
(MV/BV)^^ = Market-to-book ratio, firm /. post-regulatory 5 yr 
average, 1993-1997;
(MV/BV)*f = Miarket-to-book ratio, firm /, regulatory S yr average, 
1986-1990;
S C ^  = Total stranded costs, firm i, in 1997;
REGHI*^ = A dummy variable, firm i, equal to 1 if  the state regulatory 
environment rating is below average, and 0 otherwise in 
1997;
REGMD(^ = A dummy variable, firm /, equal to 1 if  the state regulatory 
environment rating is average, and 0 otherwise in 
1997;
RISKf = Total long-term debt to maricet value o f equity, post
regulatory 5 yr average (1993-1997) minus regulator}'
5 yr average (1986-1990), firm /;
ROE<^ = Return on equity, firm /, in 1997;
= A random error term.
Stranded costs are estimated fi)r 1997 using Resource Data International’s plant- 
by-plant estimates, and were scaled by the book value o f equity to mitigate 
spurious correlation related to size. Resource Data International’s stranded cost 
estimates include a low estimate for long-term purchase contracts Le., ixq)ut prices 
are 15% lower, and a high estimate for long-term purchase contracts Le., input
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prices are 15% higher. Equation (1) is also estimated using Resource Data 
International’s low and high estimates for long-tenn purchase contracts.
3.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis
State legislatures and regulatory commissions began e}q>loring industry 
restructuring shortly after the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was enacted. States 
began enacting restructuring legislation in 1996. Some state legislation addressed 
stranded cost recovery, however, some states deferred detailed decisions 
regarding stranded cost recovery to later legislative sessions. Enacted legislation 
may affect investors’ valuation o f stranded cost exposure. Hence, enacted 
legislation may condition the relation between the level o f stranded costs and the 
change in the market value-book value relation across periods. As a sensitivity, a 
legislative indicator variable (LEG) will be added to equation (1) to examine the 
inqxict of legislation on investors’ valuation o f stranded cost oqwsure. LEG 
equals 1 if the utility operates in a jurisdiction that has enacted restructuring 
legislation during the post-regulatory period (1993-1997), and 0 otherwise. LEG 
was interacted with the stranded cost variable.
Recent price changes in natural gas and petroleum have highlighted the 
effect of fiiel source {nice volatility on electricity rates. Accordingly, price 
volatility may affect the value of long-term purchase contracts. Hence, price 
volatility fiiced by a utility may condition the relation between its market value 
and the level of its stranded long-term purchase contracts. A volatility indicator 
variable (VOL) will be added to equation (1) to mcamine the inqrnct o f volatility 
on investors’ valuation of stranded cost mqmsure. Volatility in pricing is
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measured by calculating the average variance in 1997 daily electricity spot prices 
by region. VOL equals 1 if the utility operates in a region that has high volatility 
(above the mean variance) and 0 otherwise. To determine if  price volatility will 
condition the relation between the level of stranded costs and the change in the 
market value-book value relation, VOL will be interacted with the stranded cost 
variable.
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CHAPTER4
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
DETERMINANTS OF TIMING IN THE STRANDED COST WRITE-OFF
DECISION
4.1. Hypothesis Development
4.1.J. Financial Accounting (GAAP) — Stranded Cost Write-offs
The Federal Ene%y Regulatory Commission (FER.Q has endorsed the
principle o f full recovery o f prudently incurred Wholesale maricet stranded costs
from wholesale customers (FERC Order No. 888). However, under Order No.
888, individual states must determine recoverability of retail maiket stranded
costs. Some state policymakers have e}q>ressed unwillingness to allow recovery
of stranded costs believing that h will be extremely difficult to reconcile full
recovery o f such costs with meaningful reductions o f electricity rates (Standard &
Poor’s, 2000; Johnson et aL, 1998; Blacconiere et aL, 1997). For exanq>le, the
Arizona public utility commission will allow the Arizona Public Service
Conqjany to recover onfy $350 million of its estimated $533 million in stranded
costs. While state regulatory commissions and legislatures are structuring the
transition to conqwtition and assigning the responsibility for stranded cost
recovery, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has provided guidance for
financial reporting.
SFAS 121 provides authoritative guidance for inq)airmeot of generating
assets. Under SFAS 121, an estimate o f future cash flows from the asset must be
conqxared to its book value. The amount by which the book value exceeds the
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present value o f estimated future cash flows is the impairment loss. Such a loss 
should be reported in the income statement under other expenses and losses.
SFAS 71 allows electric utilities to capitalize certain deferred expenses as 
regulatory assets while SFAS 101 requires that if the criteria in SFAS 71 cease to 
be met, then the regulatory assets capitalized in accordance with SFAS 71 must be 
written off immediately as extraordinary losses. The Emerging Issues Task Force 
issued EITF 97-4 to provide additional guidance on when and how to appfy SFAS 
101. However, utilities still have a significant amount o f discretion in the amount 
and timing o f stranded cost write-ofife. According to EITF 97-4, firms are 
supposed to use their best judgment in applying SFAS 101. Firms are required to 
review the details of approved state-specific legislation and determine how the 
deregulation transition plan will affect its business. The result is that utilities 
must consider the immediate as well as future effects o f the deregulation 
legislation and assess the recoverability o f stranded costs. Any regulatory assets 
deemed unrecoverable and/or inpaired, must be immediately written-off as 
extraordinary losses. For example, in a December 1997 Pennsylvania public 
utility commission order, PECO was granted recovery of only $5.26 billion of its 
$8.36 billion in stranded costs. In January 1998, PECO recognized an 
extraordinary loss of $3.1 billion (before taxes) for unrecoverable stranded costs.
Long-term purchase contracts are legally binding contractual obligations. 
However, they are executory in nature and therefore no asset or liability is 
recognized Wien the contracts are initially signed. Contract details should be 
disclosed in the utility’s footnotes if the contract is material. If  the utility eiqiects
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a loss because the contract price exceeds the market price. Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 43 requires immediate recognition of the loss. Such a loss should be 
reported in the income statement under other eiqwnses and losses.
4.1.2. Regulatory Accounting - Stremded Cost Write-offs
Some state utility commissions and legislatures will not allow full recovery 
of stranded costs. When recovery is disallowed, the undepreciated amounts are 
removed from the regulatory accounting books and the loss is excluded from 
operating expenses (Arnold and Cheng, 2000). Most deregulation legislation 
allows state utility commissions to set rates based on normal costs phis a return, 
phis any recoverable stranded costs. Normal costs include operating eiqienses, 
depreciation and taxes (Loudder et aL, 1996). In most deregulatkm plans, state 
utility commissions freeze customer rates at the beginning o f a transition period. 
At the end of the transition period, the maricet determines the customer rates.
Transition rates may or may not allow for full recovery o f stranded costs. 
Utilities can reduce their normal costs during the transition, and recover some or 
all o f their stranded costs. Any stranded costs that remain after the transition 
period ends are in essence disallowed.^
4.1.3. Ecorurmic Consequences - Stranded Cost Write-offs
Stranded costs that are ^ lic itly  disallowed should be written-off for both 
regulatory and financial accounting purposes. Utilities must use their discretion in 
assessing recoverability o f other stranded costs. Any stranded costs considered
^Some deregulation orders allow certain stranded costs to be recovered after competition b% ins by 
assessing a surdiarge on all electricity consumed in the utility’s traditional geographic i
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unrecoverable should be written-ofT for financial accounting purposes. However, 
the outcome of this assessment could change the distribution o f firms* e?q)ected 
cash fiows. If a utility writes-ofif stranded costs for financial accounting purposes 
prfor to final disallowance o f cost recovery for regulatory accounting, then the 
regulator may refuse to allow recovery of assets which “disa|q>eared” from the 
financial statements (Loudder et aL, 1996). If regulators refuse recovery, the rate 
will be reduced, leading to a direct reduction in cash flows. This link between 
financial accounting write-offo and cash flows may influence the timing o f 
stranded cost write-of&. This study considers the utility’s choke to write-off 
stranded costs at the start o f the transition period versus deferring stranded cost 
write-ofife until the end of the transition period.
The economic consequences research suggests that cash flow 
consequences can be used to eiqjlain firms’ accounting policy choices. The 
economic consequences o f accounting choices result from causal links between 
firms’ cash fiows and reported accounting numbers (Hokhausen and Leftwich, 
1983). A substantial body o f economic consequences research (Ball and Smith, 
1992; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; DeAngelo et a l, 1994; Hand and Skantz, 
1997; Ayres, 1986; Healy, 1985; Soo, 1999) has focused on e}q>laining firms’ 
discretionary accounting policy choices. Industry-specific research (Jones, 1991; 
Cahan, 1992; Kim and Kross, 1998; and D’Souza, 1998) shows that regulation 
influences firms’ discretionary choices. Jones [1991] and Cahan [1992] find that 
managers make more income decreasing accruals during import relief 
investigation periods and antitrust investigation periods. Kim and Kross [1998]
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find that bank managers’ discretionary accruals are influenced by regulatory 
changes.
D’Souza [1998] considers electric utilities and the effects o f an expense- 
increasing accounting standard (SFAS 106). SFAS 106 (£nq)loyers’ accounting 
for postretirement benefits other than pensions) requires that postretirement 
enq>loyee benefits other than pensions be accounted for on an accrual basis 
instead of a cash basis. Regulators have traditionally permitted electric utilities to 
recover all cash-based enq)k>yee-related e^qienses in current rates. In the wake of 
SFAS 106, most state utility commissions now allow utilities to recover their 
accrued postretirement enqxloyee benefits.^  Accrued SFAS 106 expenses are 
significantly higher than the correqwnding cadi eiqiense (D’Souza, 2000). 
However, under the rate-based regulatory model, the regulator increases cash 
revenues to cover increased accrued expenses. Hence, the increased accrued 
expenses result in greater cash inflows, but do not affect net income.
D’Souza [1998] finds conqietitively weaker electric utilities are more 
likely to assume medical trend rates that increase accrued costs reported under 
SFAS 106. The medical trend choice significantly affects accrued cost 
confutations. Rate-regulated electric utilities benefit from higher accrued 
expenses because current cash revenues increase, whereas the cash expense 
occurs much later. D’Souza concludes that the link between accounting expenses
 ^A finv state utility commissiansoaatmue to allow recovery o f cash expenses only, and any 
excess accruals are deferred and recorded as rçgulatay assets.
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and cash flows for rate-regulated firms influences their discretionary accounting 
policy choices.
4.1.4. Hypotheses
Financial accounting standards require immediate wnte-ofife of stranded 
costs deemed unrecoverable. However, since most deregulation plans permit the 
recovery of some stranded costs during a transition period, judgment is required 
in assessing recoverability. It is likely that some utilities will defer stranded cost 
write-of6 because o f the potential negative economic consequences (e.g., 
regulator explicitly disallows a cost once it is written off for financial accounting 
purposes). This study assumes utilities are fiiced with a dichotomous choice: 
write-off stranded costs at the start o f the transition period, or defer stranded cost 
write-of& until the end o f the transition period. Based on prior research on the 
ecormmic consequences of accounting choices, certain firm-specific fectors may 
be associated with the timing of stranded cost write-offe.
Regulatory Environment
Loudder et aL, [1996] find that the state regulatory environment affects a 
utility’s ability to recover capitalized costs in fixture rates. Writing off stranded 
costs in an unfixvorable state regulatory environment may weaken a utility’s 
position and result in regulators refusing to allow recovery of assets which 
“disappeared” from the financial statements in prior years (Loudder et aL, 1996). 
Loxley [1999] also suggests that utilities fiice the regulatory risk’ o f a 
disallowance o f cost recovery should a future commission decide against it.
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Therefore, utilities operating in unfovorable state regulatory environments are 
more likely to defer stranded cost write-of6. The third hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative):
H3: Utilities that operate in more unfevorable regulatory environments
are more likely to defer stranded cost write-ofife.
Competitive Factors
Conqietitive position is likely to be a determinant in the stranded cost
write-off decision. D’Souza [1998] finds conqietitively weaker utilities are more
likely to make accounting choices that have positive cash flow consequences.
Furthermore, the capital-intensive nature o f the electric utilities industry has
resulted in very high debt levels. As a result, interest on long-term debt is the
most significant nonoperating oqiense. Stranded cost write-of& change reported
co ita l structure and might create debt covenant violations. Prior research (Daley
and Vigeland, 1983; Bowen et aL, 1981; Hohhausen and Leftwich, 1983; Kalay,
1982; and Smith and Warner, 1979) suggests that firms that are closer to debt
constraints have incentives to choose accounting methods that reduce the
probability of violating debt covenants. Firms feeing covenants pertaining to
leverage and interest coverage, are wqxected to choose income-increasing
accounting methods. Kalay [1982] finds that firms with higher debt-to-equity
ratios tend to be closer to covenant constraints and to have less available for
dividends.
Bowen et aL, [1981] and Daley and Vigeland [1983], suggest that firms
with lower interest coverage ratios are more likely to be closer to defeult on debt
covenants and thus are more likely to choose income-increasing accounting
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methods in order to ease the constraints. Ayres [1986] argues that even if  firms 
are not in violation of existing covenants, low levels of interest coverage may 
make obtaining additional debt financing more difBcuk and/or affect a firms’ 
bond rating.
Resource Data International Inc.’s Conqietitive E^qmsure Index (CEI) is a 
conqirehensive ranking of electric utility conqxmies. The CEI conqxares each 
conqxany with all others within their North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC) region. Competitively weak firms have higher CEI values. The key 
fectors included in the CEI are fixed costs, operational efficiency, financial 
structure and stranded costs. Fixed costs refers to the ratio o f the fixed cost of 
power siqxply to the total power supply costs. Operational efficiency refers to the 
relative magnitude of the total cost for electric service. Financial structure 
captures the debt-to-equity, interest cover%e and payout ratios. Stranded costs 
includes total stranded costs as a percentage of total proprietary capitaL
The preceding discussion suggests that competitively weak utilities that 
have high fixed costs, are close to covenant constraints and have cash flow 
problems, are more likely to defer stranded cost write-ofis to minim ize negative 
economic consequences. Hence, the fourth hypothesis (stated in the ahemative):
H4: Utilities with higher CEI values are more likely to defer stranded
cost write-offe.
Financial Factors
The current year’s financial performance may also influence the timing o f
write-offe (Francis et aL, 1996). If pre-write-off ROE exceeds the prior year
ROE, utilities may have an incentive to lower ROE. This is consistent with the
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“income smoothing” argument. On the other hand, if  pre>write-off ROE is less 
than the prior year ROE, utilities may have an incentive to write-off stranded 
costs in the current period. This is consistent with the “big bath” argument. To 
distinguish between these two effects, separate variables will be used to measure 
when current ROE performance is greater than or less than the prior year. Hence, 
the following two part hypothesis (stated in the alternative):
HSa: Utilities with unexpected increases in current pre-write off ROE 
are more likely to write-off stranded costs initially.
HSb: Utilities with uneiqxected decreases in current pre-write off ROE 
are more likely to write-off stranded costs initially.
Control Factors
There are several other Actors that may be related to the timing of 
stranded cost write-of6. However, these Actors are probably not influenced by 
the economic consequences o f stranded cost write-of6. Hence, the following 
Actors will be introduced as control variables: firm size, change in top 
management, and firm reorganization/restructuring.
Watts and Zimmerman [1978] suggest that firms’ preferences for an 
accounting method depend on the income effect o f the method and the size o f the 
firm. They assert that because o f political e^qmsure, large firms tend to adopt 
income reducing accounting methods. Support for this hypothesized relationship 
was found by Watts and Zimmerman [1978], Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979] 
and Zm^ewski and Hagerman [1981]. Thus, larger utilities are more likely to 
write-off stranded costs soon after passage of deregulation orders, and small 
utilities are more likely to defer stranded cost write-of&.
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Francis et aL, [1996] suggest that a recent change in top management may 
lead to discretionary asset write-of& because new management may have an 
incentive to “clear the deck” o f impaired assets to inqnove investors’ perception 
o f future financial performance, or because new management changes the 
strategic focus o f the firm. Francis et aL, [1996] find marginal support for more 
fiequent and larger asset write-of& when there has been a recent change in top 
management. Moore [1973] and Strong and Meyer [1987], also find discretionary 
asset write-ofi& are often associated with management changes. Thus, utilities 
that have e:q)erienced a recent change in top management may be more likely to 
write-off stranded costs.
Elliott and Shaw [1988] assert that managements’ preferences affect the 
magnitude and timing of write-of6 related to reorganizations and restructurings in 
a more significant and direct way than in most accounting disclosures. A major 
reorganization or restructuring may prompt greater scrutiny o f the value o f 
existing assets. This suggests that utilities reorganizing or restructuring may be 
more likely to write-off stranded costs.
4,2. Research Methodoiogy
4.2.1. Sample and data sources
The initial sanqxle consists o f the 32 investor-owned utilities operating in
states that have passed deregulation orders that allow for partial or no recovery o f
stranded costs. These utilities are included in Standard Industrial Classifications
[SICs] 4911 and 4931. The necessary data was obtained ftom Compustat, The
Value Line Investment Survey, Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, The Department
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o f Eneigy-Energy Infonnation Administration, Disclosure’s SEC Database, and 
Edgar Online Filings. The final sanq>le consists of 28 firms that have financial 
data available. O f the 28 firms, 13 reported write-ofik related to stranded costs 
and 15 firms did not report write-offî. One o f the firms reporting a write-ofif has 
estimated stranded benefits according to Research Data Inc. Three of the firms 
that did not report write-of& have estimated stranded benefits according to 
Research Data Inc. Descrqxtive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 3.
4.2.2. Research eksign
The regulatory environment variable (REG) is described in Section 3.2.2. 
The Conq)etitive E]qx>sure Ind«c (CEI) reflects the relative competitive position. 
Lower CEI values indicate a stronger competitive position. The ROE performance 
variables (ROEUP and ROEDOWN) reflect the difference between the pre-write­
off ROE and the prior-year ROE. One o f the most commonly used measures of 
size in the electric utility industry is total assets (Kihm, 1992). Thus, the SIZE 
variable is measured using the natural logarithm of total assets. The change in 
management variable (AMGT) indicates whether any o f the top-three executive 
positions (Chairman of the Board, Chief executive officer, or president) changed 
hands (Francis et aL,1996) in the year following passage o f the deregulation 
order. The reorganization/restructuring variable (REORG) indicates a major 
reorganization or restructuring in the year following passage of the deregulation 
order. Following is a summary of all variables:
REG = State regulatory environment rating, l=bek>w average, 2=
average, 3=above average;
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CEI = Conq)etitive Eiqwsure Index. Lower values indicate a
more conqietitive position;
ROEUP =(Curreiit year operating income before taxes and write-
ofi& / current year average common equity) -  Q)rior year 
operating income before taxes /  prior year average common 
equity) if > 0, otherwise 0;
ROEDOWN =(Current year operating income before taxes and write­
o f f  / current year average common equity) -  (prior year 
operating income before taxes / prior year average common 
equity) if  < 0, otherwise 0;
SIZE = natural logarithm o f total assets (in millions);
AMGT =lndicates charges in key management (chairman of the
board, chief executive ofGcer or president) in the year 
following passage o f the state deregulation order,
REORG =Indicates a major reorganization or restructuring in the
year following passage of the state deregulation order.
Descrÿtive statistics will be calculated for the variables and univariate 
tests will be conducted to see if the mean differences between the groups 
(deferred write-off firms versus initial write-off firms) are in the hypothesized 
directions. Additionally, a multivariate analysis will be used to consider the 
simultaneous effect of the variables on the timing o f the stranded cost write-off 
decision. The dichotomous choice (defer stranded cost write-offs versus initial 
stranded cost write-off) requires a dichotomous dependent variable for 
multivariate testing. The logistic model uses the independent variables to predict 
the probability that an observation is in one of the two groups. The logistic model 
uses a maximum likelihood method instead of a least-squared deviations criterion
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for the best fit. The m axim um  likelihood method maximizes the probability o f 
getting the observed results given the fitted regression coefficients.
The following equation is estimated to assess the extent to which the 
variation across firms in the timing o f stranded cost write-offe is explained by the 
variables that proxy for the incentives to minimize the economic consequences:
Stranded Cost W rite-offsi;/»b«+b/REG  b^CEI^/
(+) (-)
+ bi ROEUP iu + W ROEDOWN*, + bjSKE*,
(+) (-) (+)
+ b^AMGMT *, + byREORG *, + p*, (2)
(+) (+)
where:
Stranded Cost =1 if  stranded costs are written-off initially (Le., within
Write-oCfo *, the first year of passage o f the state deregulation
order);
=0 if stranded costs are not written-off initially 
(Le., deferred write-ofk);
p *, = a  random error term
A ll other variables as previously defined.
Note: all variables are measured fo r the year following passage o f the 
respective state deregulation order.
For testing hypotheses 3-5, the overall significance o f the model will be 
assessed as well as the individual significance of b/ - b^.
4.2.3. Sensitivity Ancdysis
The multivariate analysis includes a tobit model. The tobit model is a 
censored regression model that provides a single coefficient for each independent
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variable débité two distinct types o f dependent variables (uncensored and 
censored). In this case, the tobh model estimates the importance of the 
independent variables in e3q>laining both the timing o f the write-of^ and the 
amount o f the write-ofE The dependent variable measures the amount of the 
stranded cost write-off for utilities that write-off initially (uncensored), and no 
write-ofi^ or zero, for utilities that defer write-of& (censored). The following 
tobit model is estimated to assess the inqx>rtance of the independent variables in 
the stranded cost write-off decision:
Stranded Cost Write-off am onnt = c# + c, REG *,+ c; CEI*,
(+) (-)
+ cj ROEUP + C4 ROEDOWN4, + C5 SIZE4,
(+) (-) (+)
+ Cg AMGMT Cy REORG ^  + p ^  (3)
(+) (+)
where:
Stranded Cost Write-off am onnt =reported amount for firms
writing-off stranded costs initially (Le., within the first year of 
passage of the state deregulation order), deflated by total assets 
at the end of year /-/, and 0 for non-write-off firms;
all other variables as defined in equation (2).
For testing hypotheses 3-5, the overall significance of the model will be assessed 
as well as the individual significance o f a -  C4.
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CHAPTERS
HYPOTHESIS TESTING: MARKET VALUE-BOOK VALUE RELATION
5.7. Hypothecs 1
This study begins by demonstrating the alignment o f market value and 
book value during the regulatory period (1970-1990). Consistent with Nwaeze 
[1998], the cross-sectional mean maricet-to-book ratio during the regulatory 
period is not statistically different fiom 1. Also, the firm-specific mean maricet- 
to-book ratio during the regulatory period is not statistically different fiom one.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the market value has declined such that market 
value and book value are no longer aligned in the post regulatory period (1993- 
1997). Firm-specific, paired T-tests provide a direct test o f hypothesis 1. The 
post-regulatory period (1993-1997) firm-specific mean maricet-to-book ratio 
(1.572) is greater than the regulatory period (1970-1990) maricet-to-book ratio 
(0.965). Given the positive market reaction to FERC Order No. 888, the post- 
regulatory period was partitioned into two periods: before (1993-1995) and after 
(1996-1997) FERC Order No. 888. However, under both partitions, the maricet- 
to-book ratio is greater than the regulatory market-to-book ratio. Furthermore, the 
market-to-book ratio during the legislative period (1991-1992) is greater than the 
regulatory maricet-to-book ratio. Thus, all tests indicate that hypothesis 1 is not 
supported. The results are summarized in Table 4. Paithioning the sample into 
firms that have net stranded costs and firms that have net stranded benefits leads 
to similar results.
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5.2. Hypoüum 2a, b, and c
Hypothesis 2a predicts that firm-specific total stranded costs are related to 
the change in the market value-book value relation across periods; the regulatory 
period versus the post-regulatory period Hypothesis 2b predicts that the decline 
in the market value-book value relation across periods should be greater in 
unficvorable state regulatory environments. Hypothesis 2c predicts that the 
decline in the maiket value-book value relation across periods should be greater 
for firms with more stranded costs in un&vorable state regulatory environments.
Equation (1) provides a direct test of hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. Table 5 
presents results for tests of hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. The correlations among 
independent variables are presented in Table 6. The stranded costs coefficient (at) 
is negative as predicted, but insignificant. Thus, H2a is not supported. The state 
regulatory environment coefficients (a% and as) are both negative as predicted, but 
only the average state regulatory environment is significant. Thus, H2b is only 
marginally supported. The interaction coefficients (a« and as) are not directionally 
consistent with the predictions, and are insignificant. Hence, H2c is not 
supported.'
Equation (1) was also estimated using Resource Data International's low 
and high estimates for long-term purchase contracts. The results shown in 
Models B and C, respectively of Table S are consistent with the base case results 
reported in Model A. Models D and E of Table 5 reveal the results of partitioning
'  Research Data Inc.’s estiinates for the individual stranded cost components (generating assets, 
regulatory assets and purchase contracts) were substituted for the total stranded cost estimates in 
equation (1). In this specification, only H2b is marginally stqqmrted.
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the sample into finns with stranded costs and finns with stranded benefits. Model 
E shows that none of the hypotheses are supported for firms with stranded 
benefits. However, Model D demonstrates that H2a is supported and H2b and 
H2c are marginally supported for firms with stranded costs.
5.3. A dd^ n at Analyses and SensUMty Tests
5.3.1. Hypothesis I
Contrary to the predictions in section 3.1.4, the results presented in 
Section S.l clearly demonstrate an increase in the market-to-book ratio during the 
post-regulatory period. Exhibit 1 shows the electric utility industry maiket-to- 
book ratio increasing over time (1970-1997), and Exhibit 2 shows that the % 
change in the electric utilities mean market value (price) closely matches the % 
change in the S&P 500 Composite. The increase in the maiket-to-book ratio is 
inconsistent with the significantly negative effects on stock values documented by 
Johnson et al., [1998], and the neutral stock price reaction documented by 
Besanko et al., [2001]. However, the effects documented by Johnson et al., 
[1998] and Besanko et al., [2001] are based on abnormal returns. When 
additional analysis conducted in this study is combined with their findings, it 
appears that both the general stock market and electric utilities experienced 
positive maiket movements in the post-regulatory period. However, absent the 
positive effects of the general maricet movements, electric utility maricet-to-book 
ratios are lower during the post-r%ulatory period.
To evaluate whether general stock maiket movements might explain the 
increasing market-to-book ratio for electric utilities, an additional analysis was
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performed. The following modd was estimated to examine the possible effects of 
general madcet movements in the regulatory period versus the post-r%ulatory 
period:
+ a ,Dummy + a: + Dummy + e&, (4)
Where: M/B = Markeuto-book ratio, utility i, period t;
M/B iMitx. t = Market-to-book ratio, index, period t;
Dummy =equals 1 during the post-regydatary period (1993-
1997), and 0 during the regulatory period (1970-
1990).
The armual market-to-book index Qd/B t ) was calculated for all firms in 
Compustat (1970-1997) excluding electric utilities and financial services firms.
The coefiBdent on the interactive variable, aj, is positive and significant 
while the coefiBdent on the dummy variable, a;, is significant and negative. The 
results suggest general madcet movements as an explanation for the increase in 
electric utility madcet-to-book ratios. Furthermore, the electric utility market-to- 
book ratios appear to be more responsive to general market movements during the 
post-regulatory period. The negative coefiBdent on the dummy variable suggests 
that aside fi-om the positive effects of the general maricet movements, the electric 
utility market-to-book ratios are lower during the post-r%ulatory period than in 
the regulatory period.
Alternatively, the unantidpated increase in the market value-book value
relation could be due to other firctors For example, while increased competition
due to deregulation was expected to reduce market value of firms with excess
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capacity, deregulation would also allow some firms to focus on their competitive 
strengths, exploit their excess capacity, and actually increase their market 
concentration and monopoly power Consequently, these sustaiimble advantages 
may lead to an increase in the market value-book value relation in the post- 
regulatory period for some firms.
5.3.2. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c
By the end of 1997, eleven states had enacted restructuring legislation. 
There were thirty-three firms operating in those jurisdictions. To examine the 
impact of legislation on investors' valuation of stranded cost exposure, a 
legislative indicator variable (LEG) was added to equation (1). LEG equals 1 if 
the utility operates in one of the eleven jurisdictions with enacted legslation in 
1997, and 0 otherwise. Also, LEG was interacted with the stranded cost variable. 
The results of this sensitivity are reported in Table 7. LEG is negative and 
significant, however, the interaction with stranded costs while negative is 
insignificant. This suggests that legislation is not significantly associated with 
investors’ valuation of stranded cost exposure.
To examine the impact of volatility on investors’ valuation of stranded 
long-term purchase contracts, equation (1) was modified to include VOL, a 
volatility indicator variable. Research Data Inc.'s estimates fi>r the stranded cost 
components (generating assets, regulatory assets, and purchase contracts) were 
used in place of total stranded costs. VOL equals 1 if the utility operates in a 
region that has high volatility and 0 otherwise. Also, VOL was interacted with
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the estimate for long-tenn purchase contracts. VOL is positive and tignificant, 
and the interaction with purchase contracts is positive but insignificant.
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CHAPTERS
HYPOTHESIS TESTING: DETERMINANTS OF TIMING IN THE 
STRANDED COST WRITE-OFF DECISION
6.L Hypotheses 3,4, Sa and 5b
Hypothesis 3 predicts that utilities operating in more un&vorable state 
regulatory environments are more likely to defer stranded cost wrhe-ofifs. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that less conyetitive utilities with higher congietitive 
e^qmsure index values are more likely to defer stranded cost write-of&. 
Hypothesis Sa (5b) predicts that utilities with uneiqaected increases (unexpected 
decreases) in current ROE are more likely to write-off stranded costs initially.
A group means conq*arison (write-off firms versus non write-off firms) 
was used to consider whether various regulato^, conqxetitive, and financial 
fectors are associated with a utility’s discretionary choice to write-off stranded 
costs. The means conqxarisons are shown in Table 8. The results fer the state 
regulatory environment variable (H3) are mixed. The conqxetitive exqxosure index 
indicates lower scores or more conqxetitive firms reporting write-ofi& which is 
directkxnally consistent with H4. Firms reporting write-ofi& have larger increases 
on average in ROE than firms deferring write-of&, which is directkxnally 
consistent with H5a and the **income smoothing” argument. However, there is no 
support for H5b, the “big bath” argument, as firms with smaller decreases are 
reporting write-offs. Furthermore, size is significant in all tests, and on average, 
larger firms reported stranded cost write-ofk.
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The logistic model in equation 2 is a direct test o f hypotheses 3 ,4 , Sa and 
5b. The results are presented in Table 9. The correlations among the independent 
variables are presented in Table 10. Model A o f Table 9 includes 3 firms that 
have estimated stranded benefits. Model B excludes the 3 firms that have 
estimated stranded benefits. None of the 28 firms reported a change in 
management, therefore the AMGT variable is excluded fiom the results. The 
state regulatory environment coefficient (hi) is not significant or directionally 
consistent with the prediction, hence H3 is not supported. The conqxetitive 
exqxxsure index coefficient (bz) is not significant or directionally consistent with 
the prediction, hence H4 is not supported. However, the coefficient o f the 
conqxetitive exposure index (bz) is marginally significant at 0.10, although 
directionally inconsistent. The ROEUP and ROEDOWN coefficients (bs and h#) 
are also insignificant and directionally inconsistent, hence H5a and 5b are not 
supported.
6.Z AdditUmai Anafysis
A tobit model (equation 3) was also estimated to test hypotheses 3, 4, 5a 
and 5b. The results are presented in Table 11 and are consistent with the logistic 
model results discussed in section 6.1 and presented in Table 9. None o f the 
hypotheses are supported.
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CHAPTER?
CONCLUSIONS
Recent federal and state deregulation has increased conq)etition in the 
electricity generation industry and as a result, the market’s perception o f the 
recoverability o f certain stranded costs may affect the relation between market 
value and book value. This study examines the relation between electric utility 
maricet value and book value over time, and investigates the determinants o f a 
utility’s discretionary choice to witte-off stranded costs. The eviderx:e 
demonstrates that market value and book value are no longer aligned. 
Furthermore, the market value-book value relation has not declined; it has 
increased throughout the post-regulatory period. There is no evidence that 
stranded costs are significantly related to the change in the market value-book 
value relation when examining the entire sanq>le. However, when the sample is 
partitioned into firms that have stranded costs and firms that have stranded 
benefits, stranded costs are negatively related to the market value-book value 
relation. This suggests that the increase in the market value-book value relatk>n is 
less for firms with stranded costs. This indicates that when exam ining the entire 
sanq>le, the effects o f stranded costs are being obscured by the effects of stranded 
benefits.
The maricet value-book value relation demonstrates a significant negative
relation with average state regulatory ratings. This suggests that the increase in
the maricet vahie-book value relation is less for firms operating in states with
average regulatory ratings. However, there is no evidence that the regulatory
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ratings (average and below average) condition the relation between stranded costs 
and the market value-book value relation.
Although contrary to predictions, the results indicate the market value- 
book value relation has increased throughout the post-regulatory period. 
However, additional tests demonstrate that the increase in market value may be 
associated with general maricet movements. Thus, excluding the general market 
movements, the additional tests indicate that the market vahie-book value relation 
may be lower in the post-regulatory period than in the regulatory period.
A multivariate analysis (logistic model) was used to consider the 
simultaneous effect o f various regulatory, conqiethive and financial variables on 
the timing o f the stranded cost write-off decision. None o f the factors considered 
in the model were significantly associated with the discretionary choice to write­
off stranded costs. However, the sanqile size is small (N=28) and as a result the 
tests may have very low power.
This study demonstrates that electric utility market values and book values 
are not aligned in the post-regulatory period. The findings suggest that 
deregulation is not associated with a decline in the market vahie-book value 
relation. However, firms with stranded costs have not realized as large an 
increase in the market value-book value relation as firms without stranded costs. 
There is some indication that the increase in the market vahie-book value relation 
is associated with general market movements, vriiich might confound any 
deregulation effects.
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The findings also suggest that a utility’s discretionary choice to write-off 
stranded costs is not associated with potmtially negative economic consequences. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the change in the 
market value-book value relation, and by testing the effect of negative economic 
consequences on the discretionary choice to write-off stranded costs.
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TABLE 1
Typical Rcgnlatoiy Assets*
□  Extraordinary property losses from storm or other damage and 
environmental clean-up costs excluding any insurance coverage.
□  Unrecovered and abandoned plant and regulatory study costs that 
would normal^ be capitalized if carried through to completion, but 
the utility and regulator agree not to proceed.
□  Income taxes that are deferred for recovery through future rates 
when the tax costs are actually paid.
□  Deferred fuel costs which are eligible for recovery through a “true- 
up** of a fuel adjustment clause.
□  Pension and other benefits, including the accrual for future other- 
than pension employee benefits and early retirement costs-normally 
expenses under GAAP, these are deferred based on the regulator’s 
promise to allow future recovery.
"Loxley, 1999.
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TABLE 1
Typical Regniatoiy Assets
Demand-side management costs'* which are frequently ‘*Iumpy** in 
nature or time and deferred for collection through future rates to 
spread the costs over the period of expected benefits.
""Demand-side management includes the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring of utility activities designed to encourage consumers to modifÿ 
patterns of electricity usage.
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TABLE 2 
Panel A (ali firms) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRMS
ITEM N MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
M/B*70-*90 87 0.965 0.392 0.551 3.986 0.887
M Æ ’90 86 1.380 0.411 0.482 3.558 1.304
MIB '91 *97 88 1.597 0.447 0.859 3.548 1.523
IWB ’93-*97 88 1.572 0.465 0.738 3.578 1.473
M Æ ’97 88 1.797 0.578 0.582 4.486 1.704
R IS K ’86-’90 87 0.872 0.937 0.153 8.043 0.659
RISK*93-’97 84 0.923 1.542 0.250 14.356 0.690
REG  *97 84 2.071 0.576 1.000 3.000 2.000
ROE *97 85 0.110 0.069 -0.155 0.477 0.107
B K V A L '97 84 2,091.61 2,135.08 91.196 9,763.39 1,329.45
SCO STS 87 1,328.17 2,519.83 -1,882.65 9,647.85 445.90
GEN 87 273.98 1,548.47 -3,250.32 8,075.17 41.98
REG 87 592.25 936.19 -88.24 6,608.72 261.76
PC 87 461.93 1,187.95 -1,143.48 7,865.74 39.56
M/B (M aiket-to-teok) is defined as maricet value o f equity divided ly  book value o f ecpiity. 
RISK  is defined as S year average of total long-tenn debt divided ly  maricet value o f equity. 
REG is defined as state regulatocy environment rating, l=below average, 2=average, 3=above 
average.
ROE is defined as return on equity.
BK VAL is defined as book v^ue o f equity.
S COSTS is defined as total stranded costs as estimated by Research Data b e . (in millions). 
GEN is defined as stranded generating assets as estimated by Research Data Inc. (in millions). 
REG is defined as stranded regulatory assets as estimated by Research Data b e . (m millions^ 
PC is defined as stranded long-term purchase contracts as estimated by Research Data b e . On 
millions).
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TABLEZ
Panel B (firms with stranded costs) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRMS
ITEM N MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
M/B*70-’90 53 0.952 0.454 0.551 3.986 0.884
M /B '90 52 1.238 0.247 0.482 1.926 1.228
M/B *91*97 54 1.473 0.381 0.859 3.331 1.430
MÆ*93-*97 54 1.451 0.403 0.738 3.331 1.387
M/B *97 54 1.623 0.428 0.582 2.685 1.610
R IS K ’86-’90 53 1.090 1.139 0.153 8.043 0.822
R IS K ’93-’97 52 1.140 1.930 0.250 14.356 0.795
REG *97 53 2.019 0.571 1.000 3.000 2 .0 0 0
ROE *97 52 0.099 0.078 -0.155 0.478 0.103
B K V A L 97 52 2,530.96 2,279.63 114.06 9,763.39 1,971.81
SCOSTS 54 2,395.16 2,669.22 817.00 9,647.85 1,216.97
GEN 54 798.85 1,680.08 -1,164.14 8,075.17 317.68
REG 54 854.11 1,078.21 -26.83 6,608.72 531.98
PC 54 742.20 1,422.93 -567.22 7,865.74 193.79
All variables are defined in Pand A.
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TABLE2 
Panel C (firms with stranded benefits) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRMS
ITEM N MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
M/B ’70-’90 33 0.988 0.278 0.687 2 .1 0 0 0.901
M/B *90 33 1.605 0.517 1.165 3.558 1.471
M/B *91*97 33 1.803 0.482 1.175 3.548 1.699
M/B *93^*97 33 1.773 0.502 0.972 3.578 1.693
M m  *97 33 2.087 0.682 0.931 4.486 1.880
RISK*86-*90 33 0.526 0.223 0.209 0.992 0.478
RISK*93-*97 32 0.571 0.175 0.310 0.965 0.540
REG *97 31 2.161 0.583 1.000 3.000 2 .0 0 0
ROE *97 32 0.127 0.048 0.032 0.268 0.123
B K V A L 97 31 1,395.82 1,699.54 91.20 7,541.40 748.74
SCOSTS 33 -417.81 446.29 -1,882.65 -16.99 -221.57
GEN 33 -584.89 737.13 -3,250.32 244.74 -261.43
REG 33 163.76 353.52 -88.24 1,706.83 39.64
PC 33 3.32 299.65 -1,143.48 796.97 9.00
All variables are defined in Pand A
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TABLES 
PANELA 
(AU Firms, N^28)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
ITEM MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
SCOSTS 2,223.36 2,601.39 -1,882.65 9,647.85 1,893.26
REG 1.821 0.548 1.000 3.000 2.000
DEBT RATIO 0.474 0.077 0.240 0.610 0.480
INT COY 3.212 1.103 0.722 5.906 3.250
INT EXP 248.846 253.134 7.900 1,160.000 177.100
M Æ ’97 1.465 0.377 0.582 2.097 1.587
ROE 0.268 0.116 0.037 0.577 0.264
ROECHG 0.005 0.123 -0.419 0.218 0.006
CEI 15.607 7.549 3.000 31.000 15.000
SIZE 1.694 1.227 -1.156 3.999 1.883
TOT ASSETS 9,797.53 11,057.02 314.800 54,548.00 6,571.85
OP INC 700.418 665.132 4.100 2,900.00 590.050
EBIT 706.879 635.978 5.700 2,730.000 597.300
NET INC 80.250 402.647 -1,497.100 712.700 77.200
S COSTS is defined as total stranded costs as estimated by Research Data htc. (in millions). 
W R IT E O FF is defined as the amount o f die stranded cost write-ofiT(in millions).
REG is defined as die state regulatory environment rating, l=below average, 2=average, 3=above 
average.
DEBT RATK> is defined as total long term debt divided by book equity.
INT COY is defined as earnings befiore interest and taxes divided by interest expense.
ENT EXP is defined as total interest expense, (in millions).
ROE is defined as return on equity.
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RO E Œ G  is defined as the diange in ROE versus the prior year.
CEI is defined as Researdi Data hic.’s competitive exposure index score. 
SIZE is defined as die natural logarithm of total assets On millions). 
TOTASSETS is defined as total assets Qn millions).
O P INC is defined as operating income (in millions).
EBIT is defined as eammgs befiore mterest and taxes (in millions).
N I is defined as net income (in millions).
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TABLES 
PANELS 
(Writeofffirms, N^13)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
ITEM MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
SCOSTS 2,811.96 2,199.93 -1,079.67 7,352.33 2,453.10
W RITE-OFF 668.954 878.938 40.300 3,100.000 370.900
REG 1.846 0.555 1.000 3.000 2.000
DEBT RATIO 0.490 0.063 0.335 0.610 0.490
INT GOV 3.031 0.744 2.149 4.278 2.799
INT EXP 309.877 154.837 150.700 601.000 255.000
M/B *97 1.536 0.315 0.723 1.980 1.605
ROE 0.309 0.093 0.187 0.510 0.273
RO ECH G 0.040 .097 -0.102 0.218 0.003
CEI 14.077 6.825 3.000 29.000 15.000
SIZE 2.318 0.451 1.720 2.945 2.270
TOTASSETS 11,156.48 5,030.87 5,583.000 19,015.000 9,683.800
OP INC 891.038 417.399 324.400 1,794.000 896.100
EBIT 905.162 409.640 345.400 1,776.000 893.000
NET INC 7.400 550.302 -1,497.100 644.000 167.900
All variables are defined in Panel A
58
TABLES 
PANEL C
(Non w riie-ojf JirmSt incliuUngJimis with strandal benefüs, N^15) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
ITEM MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX MEDIAN
SCO STS 1,713.23 2,881.36 -1,882.65 9,647.85 725.98
REG 1.800 0.561 1.000 3.000 2.000
DEBT RATIO 0.459 0.087 0.240 0.592 0.460
IN T GOV 3.369 1.347 0.712 5.906 3.686
IN T EXP 195.953 310.758 7.900 1,160.000 57.400
M Æ ’97 1.404 0.425 0.582 2.097 1.456
ROE 0.232 0.126 0.037 0.577 0.235
R O EC H G -0.026 0.138 -0.419 0.125 0.008
C E I 16.933 8.119 7.000 31.000 16.000
SIZE 1.153 1.434 -1.156 3.999 0.901
TOTASSETS 8,619.77 14,521.97 314.800 54,548.00 2,462.90
O P INC 535.213 800.553 4.100 2,900.000 186.4000
EBIT 535.033 753.701 5.700 2,730.00 215.400
N ET INC 143.387 209.521 -35.100 712.700 60.800
All variables are defined in Panel A
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TABLE4
MARKET-TO BOOK RATIO
No. of FIRMS
87
88 
86 
88 
86
PERIOD
Regulatoiy
(1970-1990)
Post-regulatory
(1993-1997)
Pre-FERC Order No. 888 
(1993-1995)
Post-FERC Order No. 888 
(1996-1997)
Legislative
(1991-1992)
MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO
0.965*
1.572**
1.506**
1.646**
1.646**
*Indicates not staristically differqit from I at .OS.
**Indicates statistically dififarmt from the r^u lato ry  period, 1970-1990 at .05.
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a\
TABLES 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b AND 2c 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES fROM EQUATION (1)
(MV/BVX^ -  (M V/BVV-
#0 + #; SC i f r  *2 REGHI 83 R E G M D +84 SC * REGHI 85 SC * REGMD1^  + 84 RISK i+ 8,  ROE 1^  + € t  
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
N ao «1 «2 «3 *4 as as a?
Model A' 79 0.098 -0.106 -0.008 -0.217* 0.198 0.097 0.027 2.630*
Model 79 0.102 -0.104 -0.005 -0.216* 0.186 0.093 0.029 2.603*
Modèle’ 79 0.093 -0.107 -0.015 -0.218* 0.214 0.101 0.026 2.673*
Model 50 0.577* -0.712* -0.367 -0.565* 0.721* 0.641* 0.055 2.400*
Model E’ 
Expected sign
28 0.183 0.401
__ ,± I.. _
-1.172
. (-) .
-0.221
.....  (:)
-20.195
. _..a ..
-0.300
. a
-0.148 2.296
'BMeoue^allfinu 
’indudei lowMliiMtefiirloiig-(eraipiirctiuecoalfactf,all finnt 
’inciudn high otimate fir loag^crm purdaM coatnctt, all finnt 
*BaM oate, fimii with tuadod cottt 
'Bate oate, finnt with tttaaded benefitt 
'indkalet tigaifioanoe at 0.0S.
MV/lV)tr ** MaikeMtkhook ratio, finn /, regulatoiy 5 yr average, 1996-1990; 
fiCy, Total tirandedcottt, final, in 1997, tcaled by the book value of equity;
RECHX^ "Adummyvaiiable, final, equal to I iftbetttteregulatoiy envifoaiacat rating it bdow avenge, and Ootheiwite in 1997;
REGMD^,, > A dutnmy variable, firm I, e ^  to t if the tiate regulatoiy envbonmemi rating it avenge, and 0 otherwite in 1997;
RISKi -  Total long-term debt to market value of equity, pott regulatoiy S yr average (1993-1997) minut regulatory S yr average (1916-1990), firm I; 
ROEgr -  Return on equity, firm I, in 1997.
TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(N=79)
SC REGMD REGHl SC*REGMD SC*REGHI RISK ROE
s c 1.000 0.152 0.082 -0.981 -0.674 -0.078 0.079
REGMD 0.152 1.000 0.401 -0.187 -0.121 0.019 -0.095
REGHl 0.082 0.401 1.000 -0.083 -0.542 0.026 -0.017
SC*REGMD -0.981 -0.187 -0.083 1.000 0.672 0.036 -0 .020
SC*REGH1 •0.674 -0.121 -0.542 0.672 1.000 -0.058 0.130
RISK -0.078 0.019 0.026 0.036 -0.058 1.000 -0.531
ROE 0.079 -0.095 -0.017 -0.020 0.130 -0.531 1.000
mM
Ail varlablM are deflacd la Table S.
TABLET
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b AND 2c 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FROM EQUATION (1)
(MV/BVXr-(MV/BV)u " S o a i  SC ^ - t- 82 REGHI 8} REGMD -f 84 S C i^ * REGHI a, S C i^ * REGMD -f 86 RISK I
+ 87 ROE 1^ + 8* LEG I + 89 LEG 1 • SC i^+8|
(-) (-) (•) (•)
mw
N a , «1 «2 «3 «4 «5 «6 *7 * 8  *9
79 0.183"
Expected sign
0.044
(-)
-0.046
(-)
-0.197*
(■)
0.081
(-)
0.034
(-)
0.030 2.211* -0.144** -0.090
*indicitei tignifinnoe at 0.03.
**iBdkitei tignificanee al 0.07.
MV/BV)(r ■■ Maiket-to-bookiatk», finn i,icgulaloiy 5 yr avenge, I986*1990;
SC/f, -To*alalnndedooala,finnl, in 1997, acalod by Ihe book value of equNy;
REGHIiir ■ A Aimmy variable, finn/, equal to I if Iho riale regulaloiy enviroomenl niing ie below avenge, and 0 olhenrin In 1997;
REGMDgr ■ A dummy variable, fim i, equal to I if the amie ngulamiy envbonmemt niimg la avenge, and 0 olbemiee In 1997;
RISKi "  Total long-tenn debt to maifcet value of equity, poet regulatoiy 5 yr avenge (1993-1997) minua regulatory 5 yr avenge (1980-1990), firm /; 
ROE),r * Return on equity, firm I, in 1997;
LEGi "Equal to I if the utility operates in one of the eleven juricdictioni with enacted legiriation in I997,0othenwiw.
TABLES
a\
Column B Column C Column D
N-13 N-12 N-15
Mrm# Mnm# rin as
reportiag defcrriRg defSNTiag
VARIABLE writoHia wrH»ott‘ wriW B'
State Regulatory Environment (REG) 1.846 1.917 1.800
Conqietitive Exposure Index (CEI) 14.077 18.583 16.933
ROEUP 0.091 0.058 0.057
ROEDOWN -0.042 -0.135 -0.120
SIZE 2.318 1.135* 1.153*
RDI Estimated Stranded Costs (OOO’s) 2,811.96 2,371.44 1,713.23
Debt Ratio 0.490 0.456 0.459
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.031 3.418 3.369
Interest Expense (OOO’s) 309.877 144.825* 195.953
ROE 0.309 0.195* 0.232
Total Assets (OOO’s) 11,156.48 6,072.83 8,619.77
Operating Income (OOO’s) 891.038 413.958* 535.213
EBIT (OOO’s) 905.162 428.200* 535.033
Net Income (OOO’s) 7.400 154.117 143.387
Hywttww
H3: CoIC(ColD)<ColB 
H4: ColC(ColD)>ColB 
H5a:ColC(CoID)<ColB 
H5b:ColC/(ColD)>ColB
'Exdudn 3 finni wüh eiiiinted m nded bnwfiti.
’inelttdM 3 fiiiu  with ddOMled Muded benefits. 
*lDdicMiiigDiflcutly diflmit(itO.OS) fiom finns (opoitiii# w«ite-o(& 
REG 
CEI 
ROEUP 
olhwwiseO;
ROEDOWN 
othwwiseO;
SIZE -NetBffillogiijthmoftotileiiets (in raillions);
DERT RATIO -  LTD/Book Equity;
INT COV RATIO -  EBU/Intercst Expense.
Strae legulstoiy environnent rating, l-bdow overage, 2 -  overage, 3-nbove overage;
-  Competitive Exposure Index. Lower vshies indicete e more competitive position;
-(Current yeer operating income before texes end wrile^fR / evertge common equity) -  (prior yeer operating income before tmxes / evtrage common equity) if > 0, 
-((W ent yeer operating income before tmxes and write-offt /  average common equity) -  (prior year operating income befbre taxes / average common equity) if < 0,
TABLE9
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 3 ,4 ,5m AND Sb 
\PARAMETER ESTIMATES FROM EQUATION (2)
S(nimdedC€«*W Hh-oI&ti"b, + bf R E C p+  b;C EIt,+ b, ROEUP*, + b«ROEDOWN^ + bf S IZ E ^  b,REO RC^+
m
U1
(+) (-) (+) (-)
N bo b , bz b) b4 bs b6
Model A* 28 2.263 -0.889 0.150** -9.700 4.539 -1J50* 0.654
Model B' 25 4.762 -2.200 0J58** -15.122 17.834 -3.242* 1.627
Expccteil lifi (+) . (-L . . ............. (+ 1 . . .
'lodudei 3 &m« widi «adimtcd rinnded benefits.
'Excludes 3 fimu with estimated stnnded benefits.
*bdkstes sigmlfiesmoe at 0.05.
**lndkatesslgutfieemcemtO.IO.
StnnMCMtW rMe-nflkv - I  ifstiuded costs are written*oirinitjalIy(l.e., within the tint year of passage ofthe stale dere|ulation order), and 0 if stranded costs are not
written- off initially (i.e., deferred write-offe);
REG -  State regulalory environment rating, l"below average, 2-average, 3-above average;
CEI > Competitive Exposure Index. Lower values indicate a more competitive position;
ROEUP «(Current year operating income before taxes and write-offe / average common equity) -  (prior year operating income before taxes / average common equity) if >
0, otherwise 0;
ROEDOWN "(Current year operating income before taxes and write-offe / average common equity) -  (prior year operating income before taxes / average common equity) if < 
0, otherwise 0;
SIZE "Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions);
REORG «Indkales a major reorganization or restructuring in the year following passage of the state deregulation order.
TABLE 10
CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(N=28)
REG CEI ROEUP ROEDOWN SIEE R Eim o
REG 1.000 -0J67 0.286 -0.260 0.221 -0.128
CEI -0J67 1.000 -0.426 0325 -0.402 -0.093
ROEUP 0.286 -0.426 1.000 -0348 0.122 -0.011
ROEDOWN -0.260 0J25 -0J48 1.000 -0.472 0.124
SIZE 0.221 -0.402 0.122 -0.472 1.000 -0.116
REORG -0.128 -0.093 -0.011 0.124 -0.116 1.000
m
a\
Ail variabiM arc deflacd la Table 9.
TABLE 11 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 3 ,4 ,5m AND 5b 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES fROM EQUATION (3)
Stramdcd Coft Write-off amcont^  "c, + e, REG CEI^ + Cj ROEUP +e, ROEDOWN ^ +c*SIZE*,+ c« REORG 41 + n*,
a\
(+) (-) (+) (■)
N Co Cl C2 C3 C4 Cs C6
Model A' 28 -0.047 0.008 -0.005 0.161 -0.082 0.047** -0.055
M odels' 25 -0.078 0.017 -0.006 0.076 -0.278 0.074** -0.075
Expected g|n (+) ............. - t)  . . . _i+) . _ (-)'indudn 3 finni with «itimmied Oranded bmfiti 
’Exdadet 3 finni with nti mated itranded benefits,
*lmdkmte# ligaificanoe ml 0.05.
**ImiiGmtci rignificmace ml 0.01.
StrmaM Cmm* WrHt-off a a o H t tji -reported mmouiit for finu  writing-off itnnded corii initially (io., within the firit year of passage of the state deregulation order),
deflated by total assets at the end of year t-l, and 0 for non-write-off firms;
REG -  Stale regulatory environment rating, I-below avemge, 2 -  avemge, 3-atove average;
CEI -Competeive Exposure Index. Lower values iruflcate a more competitive position;
ROEUP -(Current year opmallng income before taxes and write-oA / average common equity) -  (prior year operating income before taxes / average common equity) if >
0, otherwise 0;
ROEDOWN -(Current year operating income befbre taxes and writo-oA / average common equity) -  (prior year operating income befbre taxes / average common equity) if < 
0, otherwise 0;
SIZE -  Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions);
REORG -Indicates a major reorganization or restructuring in the year following passage of the state deregulation order.
EXHIBIT 1 
1970 1997 Market to  Book
o\
00
0.5 -
Mmrkot to  Book (mean) 
NM7 N«B8
•70-’90 "9|.'97
ALL FIRMS 0.965' 1.597-
STRANDED COSTS/(BENEFITS) COO'S, N«87
MIN MAX MEAN TOTAL
(1.882.65) 9,647.87 1.328.17 115.550,94
*lndiatM not i^pWcamiy dWarcm from I at .05
**lndlotoi s^pWcantly diffarcnt from I at .05
EXHIBIT 2
% CHANGE
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
- 0.2
-0.4
- 0.6
S&P500Composite — - Elec, Ucils-mean price T-bills, 3-month
m
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